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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 




JESSE lVI:. GARCIA, JR~ 
Dejendfl.nt and 
Appellant. 
BRIRF OF RESPO:\TDRNT 
ST A TEl\,.IENT OF FACTS 
Case f\~ o. 9092 
Respondent takes the following exceptions to appel-
lanfs statement of f.ac~t.~: 
The killing v .. ~as not entirely the handiwork of Riven~ 
burgh, as is sho\vn by the fact that Garcia:P in a statement 
taken during the investigation and introduced at the trial 
admitted that he was in the attic at the time of the killing:r 
that he grabbed Verner~s legs, that he grappled with him, 
and that he had an ice pick in his hand. rr. 6741 685) 
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Garcia knew of, in advance, and participated in the 
plan to kill (T. 366, 674), even going so far as to make 
improvements in the borrowed knife (T. 161~ 367). 
Under examination by his attorney, Garcia claimed, 
contrary to statements made by him earlier and introduced 
into evidence by the state> that he thought Rivenburgh 
"\vas joking; but it appears that the real truth of the rna tter 
is that Garcia went to the attic to kill and had no intention 
whatsoever to serve a~ a guard for sodomy. 
The plan of action had been mapped out fully, in ad~ 
vancej and when the fight started {T. 674), Garcia did his 
part in executing the plan. It was not a case of his going 
to the aid of a stricken companion whom he supposedly 
feared, as he· now contends. 
Apparently there were two card games involved in 
the murder; one before it and one aftert the former serving 
as one occasion for planning the killing (T. 383 388~ 672) 
and the latter a circumstance set up to provide an alibi. 
(It will be noted that all of respondent's references to 
the ev]dence relate to the small typewritten number at the 
top right margin of the transc.rip t.) 
ST A TJ:GJI F~J\l·TS OF POINTS 
POI~T I 
KO PREJUDICIAL ERROR OCCURR:t:;D It\ 
THE JUDGE~S HAVING A C0~\1ERSATIO~ 
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WITII ONE OF THE JURORS OR CONVEYING 
THE SUBSTANCE OF IT TO COUNSEL; NOR 
WAS APPELLANT DENIED THE RIGHT TO 
BE PRESE~1., Arr ALL STEPS OF THE TRIAL 
BY VIRTUE OF THE CONVERSATIOI\~ 
POIKT II 
'THE TRIAL COURT DID ~OT ERR ll\ NOT 
GRANTil\ .. G APPELLAN'r'S l\.fOTIOK J'rO DIS-
MISS NOR HIS MOTION FOR DIREC1~ED 
VERDICT. 
POIKT III 
THE TRIAL COURT DID 1\0T ERR 11\' RE-
FUSING TO GI,7E APPELLA~·T'S REQUESTgD 
IKSTRUCTION l\~0. 43. 
POil\'T TV' 
~rHE TTIIAL COCTIT DID NOT ERR Tl\~ G-I'l-
11\(~ J!'iSTRUCTIO\J \1"0. 20. 
POI~T V 
THE ·TRli\.L COUH.T DID :-fOT ERR I~ RE~ 
F·lTSl:.:(~ TO GIVE .l\.PPF:TJL~;\;.JT'S REQUESTED 
Il\~STRUC'riO~ NO. l7r 
POI~T VI 
THE TRIAL C(JLTRT DID KOT ERR IX RE~ 
Fl~SI)JG TO GIVE A PPELL ... ~~T'S REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTIONS NOS. 10 and 21+ 
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POINT VII 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN RE-
FUSING TO GIVE APPELLANT'S REQUESTED 
INSTRUCTION NO. 20. 
POINT VIII 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR 1N 
FAILING TO COMPEL THE PROSECUTION TO 
FURNISH TAPE RECORDINGS AND COPIES 
OF ST A·TE~iENTS MADE BY WITNgSSES AXD 
DEFENDANT. 
POINT IX 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR I~ RE-
FUSING TO GRANT A NEW TRIAL. 
POINT X 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR I~ DE-
~-YJKG A PPET.J JA 0JT'S MOTION TO STRIKE 
TESTIMONY SHO"\VING A CONSPIRACY TO 
C01v1MIT MURDER. 
POINT XI 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR J~ SUB-
MITTING THE CASE TO THE JURY ON FIRST 
DEGREE MURDER AFTER CONSIDERATION 
OF APPELLANT~S MENTAL CONDITION .. 
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KO PREJUDICIAL ERROR OCCURRED IN 
THE JUDGE~S HAVING A CONVERSATION 
WITH ONE OF THE JURORS OR CONVEYING 
THE SUBST Al\'"CE OF IT TO COUNSEL; NOR 
WAS APPELLANT DENIED THE RIGHT TO 
BE PRESENT AT ALL STEPS OF THE TRIAL 
BY VIRTUE OF THE CONVERSATION. 
Appellant Garcia was not harmed in any way by the 
conversation between the judge and the juror. Nothing 
was added to the trial and nothing was taken away+ The 
case went to the jury exactly as it stood. The conversation 
had no effect. It was not a part of the trial as such; and 
defendant's absence was not error~ 
The judge made a full and honest disclosure of the 
substance of the conversation. It consisted of an innocent 
question as to whether cettain evidence would be intro-
duced and a noncommittal answer given by the judge, not 
dealing in any way with the merits of the case~ 
The judge did not give any expression of opinion as 
to Garcia's guilt or innocence. 
In fact~ at the conclusion of the trial, as a further pre-
caution, he gave Instruction No. 25J stating: 
~~~If~ during the course of the trial~ the Court 
has said or done something 'vhich has suggested 
to you that it is inclined to favor the claims or po-
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sition of either party~ you will not suffer yourselves 
to be influenced by any such .suggestion .. 
.t'I have not expressed nor intended to express, 
nor have I intended to intimatej any opinion as to 
\v hlch witnesses are or arc not worthy of belief, or 
what inferences should be dra,vn from the evi-
dence. If any expression of mine has seemed to in-
dicate an opinion relating to any of these mattersj 
you are instructed to disregn.rd it .. ' ' 
While not admitting any impropriety on the judgeJs 
part~ Respondent nevertheless suggests that improper re-
marks or conduct of the trial judge may be cured by in-
struction to the jury to disregard themt unless they are 
.. ~o prejudicial to accused that their affect must be deemed 
ineradicable~ 23 C~J~S. ~87(b), page 339 .. 
Our statutes intending to prevent jurors from discus-
sing the merits of matters before them are necessary, of 
course. They \vereJ however~ enacted for the purpose o£ 
keeping the jury from conversing \Vith people who might 
try to influence· their opinions.. rrhe judge is in a different 
category altogether. Certainly, he is the one truly impar-
tial person involved in the trial and by virtue of hls office 
has had long and careful training in refraining from sho"\ov-
ing any disposition ~,.hatsoever in favor of either party. 
The very nature of our judicial system requires that 
the judge be a man in 'vhom trust may be reposed and 
whose official statements are to be believed. 
The Utah cases cited by appellant in his brief seem 
divisible into two categorise: (1) Those involving jurors 
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and a third person~ not a judge; (2) those involving a judge 
in contact \Vith jurors after the jury has retired to arrive 
at a verdict. 
In most of the cases:; dealing with third parties, the na-
ture of the conversation is unknown and therefore subject 
to unlimited conjecture. Here, however~ the full substance 
of the conversation \vas given to counsel in the presence 
of the reporter and \Ve know what was said. We also kno\\o'" 
that nothing in the conversation \vas acted upon by coun-
sel. 'Ve kno\v that Carcia was not hurL 
Compared \\~ith cases dealing with a retired jur)·, thi~ 
is one in sharp contrasL Here j the conversation \vas kno¥l n 
in full at a time when som£thing could be done about it by 
counsel. There still \\'as ample time for any appropriate mo-
tions and any curative instructions that might be neces-
sary. \\:rhere a judge goes to the jury room~ on the other 
hand, it is too late then to correct any mistake that might 
have been made_ 
Since a trial judge is not only permitted, but it i~ his 
duty, to participate directly in the trial and to facilitate 
its orderly progress~ his ren1ark.~ or conduct in performing 
his duty will not co nsti tutc error if they arc such that do 
not discriminate ag~inst or prejudice the accused"~ case. 
23 C.J.S. 9R7(a), }Yage 337. 
Respondent urges the absence of error in the instant 
case. 1.\ everthe les.~ ~ should the court consider the actions 
of Judge Jeppson and the juror improper~ respondent still 
contends such error is not prejudicial. 
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In such eventt the 1950 case of People v. Woods;' 
(Calit), 218 P.2d 981~ would appear to be directly in point 
and its decision should be followed by this court. There 
the trial judge in chambersJ in the presence of the reporter 
but the absence of defendant and both counselt held a dis-
cussion with a certain juror. Largely, the conversation 
dealt with the behavio-r of the juror the previous day in 
making contact with the district attomey~ However, it 
dealt also with matters of substantive law~ The court was 
asked by the juror the question: '~VY'bat is a hung jury?'t 
The judge gave a full legal answer in responser 
Regarding these cricumstances the Supreme Court 
stated: 
~ · • * • Private communications bet\v een a judge and 
a juror with respect to matters related to the case 
are of course improper~ but nothing took place in 
the conversation complained of which could possi-
bly have prejudiced defendant and therefore it did 
not constitute reversible error~ It 
An interesting case involving the conversation of a 
juror and a judge is that of State v. Morris, (Ore~)~ 114 P. 
476+ There a juror was approached with the offer of a 
bribe after testimony had ended but before argument. He 
tried to call the judge but failed and then talked to the 
prosecutor. The prosecutor called the judge. The judge 
and the juror and counsel for the state met at the police 
station and discussed the bribery attempt_ The judge then 
proceeded to tell the juror not to allow the bribery try to 
affect his judgment in the case under consideration. The 
Oregon Supreme Court held this conversation not to be 
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pre judicia 1 error as misconduct either of the judge or of 
the juror, even though it dealt somewhat with the case un-
der consideration, and even though it was held outside the 
courtroom. 
In State v. Costales~ (N. Mex.), 19 P.2d 189, the judge 
sent a communication through the bailiff to the jury after 
it had retired~ The rule against communication between 
judge and jury was treated there as follows: 
~~The rule has been greatly relaxed in modern 
times ( 16 C.J. 1 165)~ and this is reflected in the de-
cision of this court in State v. Cle1n ents J 31 ;.J. W. 
620~ 249 P. 1003, 1008j where l\ir. Justice Watson~ 
speaking for the court, said: ~\Ve cannot admit7 
therefore, that it is the law of this state that the 
bare fact of an unauthorized and improper com-
munication necessitates in all cases a new tria 1, 
even in capital feloniesL \Vhen it appears that there 
has been such communication, the important que~­
tion is \vhether prejudice has resulted~ Such a com-
munication certainly requjres cxplanation1' not only 
to secure the accused his rightst but to maintain 
the court~s authority. But if it satisfactorily appears 
that the communication tvas harmless and had no 
effect on the verdict, the rights of the accused do 
not require1' and public interest does not permit~ 
the granting of a new trial'/' 
In \.ilalter v. State, (Okla.), 233 P. 240l where the 
judge answered a question of a retired jury through an 
intennediary-t the court held thut the communication ~ras 
not of great importance and did not result in harm to the 
defendant and refused to hold that. prejudicial error had 
occurred~ 
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In Lewis v~ State:~ (Okla.L 119 P.2d 91j the trial judge 
had a communication with jurors outside the courtroom 
in the absence of defendant or his counsel While the court 
granted a new trial under the exact circumstances:P it did 
go so far as to say that although there is a presumption of 
prejudice under the circumstances~ the state rnay prove 
that the defendant was not prejudiced by reason of such 
misconduct. In Green v. State,. ( Oklar), 281 P .2d 200, the 
court again affirmed that the presumption of prejudice 
can be overcome by proper proof. 
In the instant case7 the court has adequately proven 
the absence of prejudice. The Utah court in an analogus 
case, State v~ Burns., 79 U. 57Gt 11 P~2d 605, held that where 
the jury separated improperly, the state was entitled to 
show that no prejudice occurred therefrom+ See also Peo-
ple v. Alcalde, (Calif..)~ 148 P.2d 627L 
In People v~ Kasem~ (Mich.L 203 N~W. 135, the judge 
had a meal at the same table with jurors and his action 
\vas not deemed prejudicial. 
In State v+ Newland, (Mo.)J 285 S~WL 400) a foreman 
went alone to the judge, asking about certain evidence. 
The judge declined to give information ~s to the evidence 
and the conversation was held to have been without 
prejudice+ 
Appellant cites a number of cases in this general area, 
hut all of them can be distinguished easily from the one 
at hand. 
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The following are examples~ 
In State v. Anderson, 65 U. 415~ 237 P. 941 (App. Brief~ 
p. 8), a juror and the prosecuting witness had ridden to~ 
gether to and from court daily during the course of the 
trial+ rr he effect y...· a~ that the juror communicated with 
the prosecutionj inasmuch as the witness was in contin-
uous contact with counsel for the state+ Here, in the Garcia 
case, the juror who talked with Judge Jeppson had no 
communication with any party to the action, but only \Vith 
the one neutral in the courtroom+ In the Anderson case the 
prosecuting witness performed a substantial senrice or 
favor for the juror~ and this concerned the court.. That is 
not so here. 
In Johnson v. JJiaynard) 9 U.2d 268t 342~ P.2d 884, the 
judge entered the jury room to answer a question, so the 
case is not in point. 
In State -c. Thorne, 39 Ur 208, 117 P. 58, a juror talked 
\vlth someone over the telephone after the case had gone 
to the jury. There was mystery as to the contents of this 
conversation~ held \vith an unknown third party~ 
Cnfortunatel.':r .. ~ the prosecution apparently made no 
effort to shO\V that the conversation was not prejudicial-
which it had a right to do, according to the follo\ving lan-
guage of the court: 
~'* * * It is enough tl1ut the stutc * * ~~ is per-
mitted to sho\\~ that the conduct, though wrongful 
and ln disobedience of the sttitute and the directions 
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of the court, nevertheless was harmless, by show-
ing all that was said and done, and by clearly and 
affirmatively showing that the accused was not, 
nor could have been, prejudiced there by.'' 
Here, Judge Jeppson put the whole substance of the 
conversation into the record and since it was not acted 
upon by counsel for either party and since he conveyed 
no infonnation as to hls o-wn attitude toward either party~ 
the verdict should not be disturbed. 
In State v. Crank, 105 l~. 332, 142 P r2d 178, the court 
did not go so far as to decide actually whether the conver-
sation was reversible. There, too:' it involved a juror and 
a prosecuting witness. 
Appellant cites a number of cases in support of his 
proposition that appellant was denied due process in that 
he was not present at all stages of the proceedings. In State 
v. Jfortensen~ 26 U. 312, 73 P. 562~ defendant refused to 
accompany the jury to the scene of the crime for a view 
of the premises. Notwithstanding this refusal~ counsel on 
appeal claimed that the excursion to the site constituted 
a portion of the trial and that he was deprived of his rights 
to be present at all stages. The court then went on to state: 
~~* * • but \V"e are unable to concede that the view 
was either a part of the trial or the taking of evi-
dence~ within the contemplation of the Constitution 
or the statute.'~ 
The same rule should prevail here~ The conversation 
between the judge and the juror was not a part of the trial 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
13 
and appellant's absence therefrom did not constitute a 
denial of due process. 
In the Mortensen case the court continued: 
"* * * Thit1 does not mean that the defendant must 
all the time be in the actual pt·esence of the jury~ 
but rather that he must be at the trial in court and 
in its presence~ The court is the real thing, fixed 
and permanent. The jury is but a temporary ad-
junct for a partia 1 purpose of the trial."' 
Counsel for appellant was present at the time the judge 
told the substance of the converation .. That was a parl of 
the proceeding~ The incidental conversation was not. 
Appellant urges additional error in that the judge not 
only had the conversation with the juror~ but also conveyed 
it to counseL On the contrary~ the placing of the conver~ 
sation in the record brought all the facts to light and elim-
inated any mysterious circumstances that might othenvi~e 
have created doubt. 
Appcllanfs quotation from Stale v. lY!arti-nez, 7 U.2d 
387~ 328 P.2d 102, is far afield froln the case at hand. It 
deals with direct questioning of witnesses b~/ jurors. Heret 
no such thing was attempted. The juror had no intention 
whatsoever to talk directly with any witness. He only 
\.\'anted to know if '~c )U n;:.;el was going to introduce a cer-
tain tape recording in evidence. Even if the conversation 
here had been a direct oner \VithOUt the judge as intermed-
iary, it still V~.~ould have been between the juror and an 
attorne.r and not bet\veen a juror and a witness. 
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Finally, neither side did anything at all about the in-
formation given by the judge. Therefore, if error did occur 
in the conversation, it '\vas not pre judicial for the reasons 
set out above+ 
POINT II 
THE 'TRIAL COURrr DID 1'\0~"r ERR I~ N01' 
GRANTING APPELLA:NTJS rYIOTION TO DIS-
MISS NOR HIS IviOTION FOR DIRECTED 
VERDICT. 
\Vhi le it is true that the state has the burden of prov-
ing beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant is guilty, 
respondent believes that appellant has tortured the law 
in claiming the judge was obligated to dismiss the action 
()~ r.o him, or to direct a verdict in hls favor. 
If the court were to adopt appellant's theory that 
\.\'henever the evidence· indicates a ~'reasonable hypothesis"1 
of innocence~ the case should not be allowed to go to the 
jury, a 11 normal criminal practice \vould be stifled and 
perhaps totally destroyed. Any defendant could be expect-
ed to conjure up such '~evidence' 7 as would corntitute a 
prima facie "'reasonable hypothesisn of innocence and the 
state~ s case 'vould automatically dissolve. This is not the 
la1-v in Utah. 
It is true that if the state \vere to fa U to produce evi-
dence sufficient to make out the elementH of the crime the 
' 
court 1v-ou ld be justified in dismissing the action or direct_ 
ing a verdict. But th~t is not so here. 
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Our system of jurisprudence has from earliest times 
contemplated that a jury of a man;rs peers should find the 
facts of his case~ with the law to be determined by the 
judge. It is the sole and exclusive province of the jury to 
determine the facts in all criminal cases, whether the evi-
dence offered by the state be \Veak or strong, in conflict~ 
or not controverted. Evidence may be ever so convincing 
that an accused is guilty or innocent of the crime charged, 
yet it is for the jury- and not for the trial judge to render 
the verdict. See State v ~ Green, 78 U. 580, 6 P~2d 177 4 
Where there is adduced, in a criminal prosecution, 
competent evidence from \Vhich a jury can find beyond 
reasonable doubt that the defendant perpetrated the crime 
with which he is charged~ there can be no error in failing 
to direct a verdict of acquittal. State v. Peterson:' 121 U. 
229, 240 P.2d 504. 
Addressing itself to the three questions of motion to 
dismiss, motion for directed verdict~ and motion for ne"v 
trial, the court said in the recent case of State v. Pender-
ville, 2 l~.2dr 281, 272 P.2d 195: 
H* * * It has been repeatedly held by this court 
that upon a motion to dismiss or to direct a verdict 
of not guilty for lack of evidence that the trial court 
does not consider the weight of the evidence or 
credibility of the 1.vitnesses, but determines the 
naked legal propor~i tion of la'v 1 whether there· ls any 
substantial cvid~ncc of the guilt of the accused, 
and all reasonable inferences are to be taken in 
favor of the state. * * ~ As is pointed out in one or 
more of these cases, the trial court has a dj sere tion 
in the case of a motion for a new trial that it does 
not have in case of a motion to dismiss or to direct 
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a verdict of not guilty. Nevertheless, in either case 
if there is before the court evidence upon which 
reasonable men might differ as to whether the de-
fendant is or is not guilty, he may deny the 
motion/~ 
Appellant uses State v~ Erwin~ 101 lJ. 365t 120 P.2d 
285~ to say that if the facts relied on by the state are not 
inconsistent with defend ant! s innocence~ it is established 
as a matter of law~ The court there affirmed the decision 
against appellant and went on to say: 
H* * * It is not necessary that each eircumstance in 
itself establish the guilt of the defendant, but the 
whole chain of circumstancest taken together~ must 
produce the required proof. State v. Crawford, 59 
Utah 39~ 201 P. 1030; State v. J!arasco~ 81 Utah 325t 
17 P.2d 919; Terry v. United States_, 9 Cirr, 7 F.2d. 
28; State v. Burch, Utah, 11~) P.2d 911. 
~'On the other hand~ if there is any substantial 
evidence which satisfies the above requirements~ 
then the \Veight of the evidence is for the jury, and 
the court \r-iH not dif;turb the verdict. State v. Le-
wellyn, 71 UttJh 331, 226 P. 261; State v. Odekirk, 
56 LTtah 272, 190 P~ 777.~' 
State v. Lewellyn, 71 U. 331, 266 P. 261t was an adul~ 
tery prosecution~ Defendant made a motion for directed 
verdict. The court said: 
(~In 16 C.J. 935:r the conclusions of various 
courts are con den sed in the statement: 
'~ ~As a general rule the court should direct a 
verdict of acquittal * • * where there is no compe-
tent evicl ence reasonably tending to sustain the 
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charge; or where the evidence is undi~puted and 
so weak that a conviction would be attributable to 
passion or prejudice, or where it is so slight and 
indeterminate that a verdict of guilty would be set 
aside, as where the evidence consists solely of the 
uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice or is 
insufficient to overcome the presumption of inno-
cence, or to show defendant's guilt beyond a rea-
sonable doubt. But the case should be submitted to 
the jury and the court should not direct a verdict 
of acquittal, if there is any evidence to support or 
reasonably tending to support the charge? as where 
it i;:.; sufficient to overcome prima facie the pre-
sumption of innocence, or where the evidence of a 
materia I nature is conflictingr' 
""From Pace v. Commonwealth~ 170 Ky~ 560, 
186 S~\V-. 142~ we quote the syllabus on this point 
as follows: 
(~ ~It is only~ in the absence of any evidence 
tending to establish the guilt of the accused that 
the trial court will be authorized to gr-ant a perem p-
tory ins true tion directing his acquittal.~ . . . 
HAn able discugsion and determination of the 
bounds of judicial authority in considering a mo-
tion for a directed verdict is contained in Isbell v_ 
lr S. 142 C.C.A. 312, 227 }1"7 788~ in which it is made 
clear that the court in ~uch case does not consider 
the weight of evidence or credib1 I it y of witnesses 
but determines the naked legal proposition of law 
whether there i.~ any substantial evidence of the 
guilt of the accused. 'fhis is undoubtedly the cor-
rect rule. See annotation ~Directing Acquittal~~ 17 
A.L+R+ 910. The funetion of a court in dealing \vith 
an application for a directed verdict must not be 
confused with that in considering a motion for a 
ne\v trial upon the grounds of insufficiency of evi-
dence. The court has a discretion in the latter case 
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v.rhich he does not properly have in the former. The 
reason for the distinction is that the order sought in 
one case acquits the accused and finally ends the 
prosecution, while in the other, the order .. if grant-
edt does not discharge the accused but merely gives 
him the advantage and benefit of another triaL The 
rule is controlled by the same principles in crim-
inal cases as in civil procedure. .And in a civil case~ 
Stam v. Ogden P + & ]J. Co., 53 Utah 248, 177 P~ 218J 
the eourt said: 
'' ~It is familiar doctrine in this jurisdiction and 
perhaps in nearly every other where the jury sys-
tem prevails, that1 if there is any substantial evi-
dence v..~hatever upon \v·hich to ba5e a verdict, the 
court will not withdraw the case from the jury or 
direct what their verdict should be~.'"' 
Appellant presents an hypothesist whlch he terms 
reasonable, containing ten general elements calculated to 
show the innocence of appellant. (App. Brief, p. 29) _4._ll go 
to the single point whether or not Garcia knew that Riv-
enburgh planned to kill Vernert and not just commit sod-
omy with him. 
Garcia does not base his motions on a denial that he 
was physically present during the stabbing~ His own state~ 
ments on the 'vi tness stand~ along "\V ith those transcribed 
during the investigation and introduced in evidence~ were 
absolutely conclusive as to his participation in the killing~ 
( T. 366~ 573) 599, 677) 
·As to the matter of intent, Garcia kne'v of the pro-
posed killing from the very beginning. While he claims 
he thought the threats of Rivenburgh were made in a jok-
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ing manner, he specifically admits their being made and 
his having knowledge of them before the killing .. Lt. Wil-
liam L. Robinson took the stand and read questions asked 
by Mr. Banks and answers given by Garcia at an interroga-
tion held under formal circumstances at the prison during 
the first stages of the investigation. The statement was 
introduced in evidence. Beginning at T .. 366~ the colloquy 
is as follows: 
"Q.. Will you tell us 'vhen you first heard about 
this killing? 
A.. Well, as far as I can remember~ it all started 
\vhen all of us "\Vas up there playing cards. I think 
it was Bowne's cell-I ain't sure. 
Q. \Vhen was thaf! 
~-'\.. Sunday night. 
Q. Go ahead~ Jes~c. 
A. And I thought it was all a joke at first. 
Q. \Vhat wa~ said and by 1.vhom? 
/\. Well:r Mack said that he was going to kill the 
Polock.'' 
(T. 3661 367. See also testimony at T. 672.) 
This conversation necessarily must have taken place prior 
to the killing. The threatening words definitely refer to a 
future event. N () other reasonable interpreta ti < )11 of the 
language used is possible. (T. 674-675.) 
Further~ Garcia is quoted, in the testimony of Prison 
Guard 'Villiam R. Haueter (T~ 674-675), as having given 
the following statement in the presence of himself and 
several others just prior to the interrogation testified to 
by Lt. Robinson~ during the original in vestiga tiont with 
questions being asked by Mr. Banks: 
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''Ar * * * any-\vay I was not thinking straight I 
thought he was joking~ anyway, he said 'Lees go 
up and kill the Polack.' The Polock was locked in 
his cell, somehow he got out of his cell, but I don~t 
know nothing about that. Me and Bowne went up 
the front \Vay, and we got laying on the other side 
of this big ventilator~ I don't know \\··hat the hell 
it was~ 
He came up and then Bo\VIle cut out over 
there, and then after the pounding and screaming, 
then I \vent over there, and I don''t know too well 
about it. I know I grabbed his legs~ and I had that~ 
I had the ice pick~ 
Q. You had the ice pick? 
A. Yes. 
Q~ )Tow who was with you when Rivenburgh said~ 
'Let's go up and kill the Polack'?~' 
~~And at that time did he point at anyone?'' 
~'A. Yes he pointed at Bo\V11e/' 
''Q. Bowne wa:-J with you? 
A~ Yes. 
Q. Did you an~wer that? 
A. Yes. 
Q. All right. The three of you \\-~ere together when 
he said ~Let's go up and kill him.;, Ko\\• did he dis-
cuss with you-you said you \Vere supposed to be 
the point man+? 
A. Yeah. He was supposed to make a punk out 
of him or something. I don~t knO\\~ how, or hov.t 
he done it, see~ but he had an affair with him be-
fore, so he just went up there to make out of him 
and have him for his kid~ that's all, how we under~ 
stood it at first, and then he pulled out this knife. 
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Q+ That's 11ack"! 
A4 So we thought he was just joking about it, and 
we went up there anyw-ay .. 
Q. But he said, 'Let's go up and kill him.t Is that 
right?~' 
"THE 'VIT KESS: He nodded 'yes' .. ~J 
This is clear and convincing evidence of prior knowledge 
on the part of Garcia~ despite his derrial at the tria I. 
Since Appellant Garcia's statements, introduced into 
evidence~ clearly indicate a foreknow ledge of the crime, 
respondent will not labor the matter of exactly where and 
when the knowledge was obtained and as to when certain 
card games, at one of which the planning may have been 
done, were actually held. (App+ Brief, p .. 27.) 
It should be noted~ however~ that Randel testilied at 
T. 269 and T. 299 to the effect that Garcia was in the next 
cell to that in which a conversation as to the plans for the 
killing took place during a card game. At T~ 32-0 Randel 
testified that a person in a cell could hear another in an 
adjoining cell talking in the same tone of voice Randel 
\\'"as using on the witness stand. 
Definitely, then,. there \Vas not just the one card game 
after the killing~ but one prior to it also. (T. 388, 672.) The 
court had considerable discussion with counsel cr. 383) 
dealing with the card games at the time :1-ir. IIansen made 
his two motions, the rulings as to which have been ap-
pealed fromt and this should clear up the matter. 
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Even so, it is not of great importance whether or not 
any card game pre-dated the killing in light of Garcia~s 
own clear statement, supra, that he had heard Rivenburgh 
tell of his plan .. 
Further testimony as to appellant~s intent is shown 
in the following answer from one of Garcia~s statements 
given at the time of the original investigation: 
''Q. He had screamed before Bowne went over? 
A. ~o., he screamed~ so l run over, circled all 
around. I was already circling around before the 
ye1ling and the kicking started. 
Q. Urn huhr Did you strike any of the blows? 
A~ I can't remember. 
(T~ 677.) 
This shows that Garcia began to approach the victim and 
to maneuver for position even before any supposed cry for 
he1p 1-vas uttered by Rivenburgh or any defensive motions 
were made by VeTner. So it was not a case of aiding a 
stricken buddy~ It was, rather, part of a carefully precon-
ceived plan to commit murder .. 
Of course it is absurd to suppose that two grown men 
with knives \vere necessary for protection in a homosexual 
relationship~ to which relationship Verner was not adverse. 
The practice was somewhat prevalent and bodyguards and 
lookouts anyplace~ let nlone the attic~ '\v-ere uncommon and 
unnecessary. 
The fact that Garcia went to obtain a Imife from 
l)alton (T. 157}~ made some changes in it (T~ 161)~ and 
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went with Bowne to the attic indicate foreknowledge and 
intent. 
In light of clear law in Utah {See State v. Penderville~ 
supra~}, it would have been a serious abuse of discretion 
for the judge to make any other ruling than he did, con-
sidering the evidence adduced. There is no question what-
soever that evidence of Garcia's ·implication in every act 
necessary to constitute first degree murder \vas clearly in 
evidence at the time the judge ruled and that it was added 
to thereafter .. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN RE-
FUSIKG TO GIVE APPELLANT'S REQUESTED 
11\STRUCTION NO. 43. 
Clearly, a defendant has no right to have an instruc-
tion given in his own words where the applicable law is 
given by the court. State v. Cox, 106 U. 253~ 147 P.2d 858~ 
Appellant asked for an instruction using the follo,ving 
words: 
~~=-r * * you are instructed that whether you make 
such a recommendation is entirely within your 
discretion to be exercised in any manner and for 
any reason you see fit. You are not to be influenced 
or intimidated by the Court in this absolute right 
of yours as jurors.'' 
(R~ 95) 
The court instead gave its Instruction No. 1 7 ~ 1Nhich states 
in part: 
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"* * • and if you find the defendant guilty of Mur-
der in the First Degree, then you should consider 
the question of making such recommendations; and 
in considering this questiont you are instructed to 
give it your careful and con sci en tious consideration~ 
and if made~ you must include it in your verdict.H 
(R~ 115) 
Appellant claims prejudice not only because of the 
terms UBed in the court~s instruction but aL::o in view of 
Instruction Nor 7, which states in part: 
''Prejudice, passion and sympathetic feelings 
have no place whatsoever in your deliberations~ 
You should disregard all bias~ prejudice:r and other 
extraneous influences.'' 
(R~ 103) 
Appellant points to the instruction given in the case 
of State v~ Thorne) 39 U. 208, 117 P. 58, wherein the court 
said: 
'~* * * And if you should find the defendant guilty 
of murder in the first degree you should then con-
sider the question of making such recommendation. 
and it will be your duty to consider such question 
i11 the same manner as any other question submit~ 
ted to yon, giving to it your careful and conscien-
tious consideration; • * * . :.~ (Emphasis added.) 
The court held that the italicized part of this instruc-
tion was error because in giving it, the court undertook 
to guide and direct the jury in the determination and ex-
ercise of a discretion which the law conferred on then1 in 
terms unlimited and unprescribed~ 
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Things are entirely different here since all of the of-
fensive language found in the Thome case has been 
deleted. 
In State v. M ewhinney:o 43 U. 135, 134 P. 632, the court 
failed to find error in an instruction stating: 
'~In considering this question you are not re-
stricted by any rule of law or public policy, but 
are entitled to decide the question from such con-
siderations as may appeal to you as reasonably and 
conscientiously en titled to be ~reighed in de~ 
termining the giving or 1vithholding of such 
recommendation~~' 
The court found the defendant's attempt to bring the above 
instruction under the rule of the Thome case untenable 
for the reason that the court did not attempt to direct or 
control the judgment of the jury. The ],.fewhinney instruc-
tion certainly is more questionable than the one here:o 
especially considering its use of the terms "reasonably and 
conscientiously.' 1 Therefore~ it would be improper to deem 
Instruction ~ o. 1 7 error. 
Respondent cannot concede that appellant suffered 
any real prejudice by virtue of any relationship that might 
exist between that portion of Instruction No .. 7 dealing 
with prejudice, passion} etc~ and Instruction No. 17} supra, 
llealing with recommendation of mercy. 
Certainly, Instruction No. 7 is a standard instruction, 
the essence of which has been incorporated in many cases 
and which clearly expresses the proper approach that 
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must be taken by the jury in considering the case as a 
whole. It cannot cy its terms be considered in any way 
to limit the right of a jury to make any recommendation 
it may desire for any reason whatsoever. In fact the por~ 
tions excluding '~prejudice and passion~'' might well be con-
sidered by the jurors as an invitation to make a recom~ 
mendation of niercy) rather than a restriction against doing 
so. 
Appellant~s claim is founded upon a supposition too 
vague and too remote. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN GIV-
I~G INSTRUCTION NO~ 20~ 
Appellant objects to that portion of Instruction No. 20 
~T hlch states as follows: 
~'You are instructed that one who keeps watch 
""'""here a crime is being perpetrated) so as to facil-
itate the escape of one actually committing it, or 
to prevent his being interrupted, if the said keeping 
watch i:1 pursuant to a common design to commit 
the crimeJ said person keeping "\Vatch.~ is aiding and 
abetting' and is a principal. n 
{R. 119) (EmphasiB added) 
Appellant says the jury could have construed the 
terms ~'a crimen and uthe crime~' so as to refer to the act 
of sodomy. This~ of course~ is untenable. 
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The only reasonable interpretation of the court~s in-
struction is that it applies to the crime charged, first de-
gree murder, to which the jury was directing its sole 
attention. Appellant never was charged with the crime of 
sodomy~ and the jury knew this. 
It appears that appellant is d eating in semantics~ in-
tending to hang his case on single words and phrases as 
Bga inst the en tire instruction and, in fact, as against all 
the instructions taken as a whole~ 
In Bridges v. U. S.;o 199 Fed.2d 811, the court said: 
~'* * * Instructions given in a criminal prosecution 
may not be· taken apart and a phrase here and a 
clau~e, or even a sentence or paragraph, there used 
to find error.H 
In People v .. Marsh, (IlL), 85 K .. E.2d 715, the court 
stated: 
u* * * ~4-ccuracy in the use of language in an in-
struction containing a correct proposition of law 
would, of course:r be desirable, but it is not always 
obtainable. For that reason we announced the r11le 
that it is s uff i c i en t if the series of ins tru ctio ns, con~ 
sidercd as a whole, fully and fairly announce the 
law npplicable to the theories of the People and of 
the defendant~ respectively. People v. lJe Rosa~ 378 
111. 557., :19 ):[. E .2d 1; J:leople 't;. Hichette, 324 Ill. 
170~ 1G3 N . .I:G. 39." 
In Taylor v. Sta.te:o (Okla.)~ 208 P.2d 185, it \Vas held 
that even where it appeared that the instruction com-
plained of was ~~most poorly \vordedt'' but not misleading 
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in light of ali the instructions, it did not constitute reversi-
ble error. 
In State v ~ Zeimer, __ U ___ , 3 4 7 P2d. 1111, decided 
January 5, 1960j the court treated a similar question 
where, in an habitual criminal matter, the instructions 
referred to the charge as an offense~ to the question of de-
fendanes guilt, and to the burden of proof necessary to 
conviction. There the court said~ 
"While defendant is semantically correct, he 
is legally without reversible error because the in-
structions are not prejudicat The jury was in-
structed upon the meaning of habitual criminal and 
upon the required elements and burden of proof.'' 
Furthermore, the law in Utah is that all instructions 
are to be considered together and construed as a whole. 
State v. Evans, 74 U. 389t 279 P. 950; State v. Hendricks, 
123 U. 267, 258~ P.2d~ 452+ The jury in the instant case 
knew this was so by virtue of Instruction No. 28~ which 
states as follows~ 
'~These instructions are to be considered al ~ 
together as a \Vhole, and not as if each instruction 
\vere a complete statement of the law by itself~ 
And even though a role, direction or thought is 
stated in different ways and repeated in more than 
one instruction you should not give it undue em-
phasis and ignore others. But you should consider 
all of the instructions as a whole and apply them 
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Considering all the instructions together, as we must 
dot any possible error is corrected by Instruction No. 6, 
\li.rhich reads as follows: 
'~There is some evidence in this case of the 
commission of other crimes. There is no crime 
charged, however, in this case except murder and 
the included offenses which will be described here-
in. Testimony of any crime not cha:rged is not evi-
dence that the Defendant is guilty of murder or the 
included offenses. 
'
4lf another crime is connected with the alleged 
murder, you .may consider said other crime as you 
would any other act relating to the alleged circum-
stances connected with the alleged murder.'' 
(R. 102} 
Appellant claims the jurors were biased and preju-
diced against him for the reason that sodomyt ~~the crime 
against nature," for which he claimed to have been a look-
outt is capable of engendering deep-seated pre judices 
against anyone connected with it~ and says it would be 
difficu 1 t for the jurors to appreciate the fact that no one 
was being prosecuted for perversion. Instruction No. 7 
would tend to eliminate his objection in stating: 
'~Prejudice) passion and sympathetic feelings 
have no place "\Vhatsoevcr in your deliberations~ 
You should disregard all bias, prejudicet and other 
extraneous influences.~' 
(R. 103) 
Even if error occurredt it was fuliy cured by all the 
instructions taken as a whole and there is no prejudice 
here. 
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POINT V 
THE TRIAL COCRT DID NOT ERR IN RE-
FUSING TO GIVE Al)PELLANT'S REQUESTED 
I='J"S1,RUCTION NO 17~ 
Appellant claims error in the refusal of the court to 
grant an instruction directing that his motive be consid-
ered as strong evidence of the guilt or innocence of the 
accused and that: 
~'* * * The absence of a motive on the part of the 
defendant * .;i; * strengthens the presumption of de-
fendant~s innocence and may raise a reasonable 
doubt as to his guilt.'' 
The refusal was in no way prejudicial to appellant 
in Jight of all the instructions given in the trial. (See ar-
gument under respondentts Point IV.) While it is. true 
that motive may be considered as any other fact~ it is also 
true,. as stated in the case of People v. Tom Woo.t (Calit), 
184 P. 389 1 that: 
~ · * * * if the proof of guilt is nevertheless sufficient 
to overthrow the presumption of innocence~ the ap-
pellant must stand convicted, notwithstanding no 
motlve has been shown_,, 
In Glnh'S ·v. State;> (Ala.}} 41 So. 727, the court held that 
in a prosecution for murder an instruction, that if the state 
failed to sho\v any motive on the part of defendant to com-
mit the offense charged and his guilt was not clearly prov~ 
en, such absence of motive considered in connection with 
all the evidence in the case might in the minds of the jury 
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create a reasonable doubt of defendant's guilt, was prop~ 
erly refused. See also 23 C~J.S. 1198, pg. 749. 
POINT VI 
'"fHE TRIA .. I-' COLTRT DID 1\"0T ETIR 1).]" ITl:S-
FUSIN{; TO Gl v·r~ APPELLJ\N'r'S REQUESTED 
IKSTRUCTIO='fS :\J(JS. 19 AKD 21. 
Appellant \Vas not entitled to have instructions given 
in his own words fot· the reasons set forth earlier in this 
brief. He was entitled only to a fair statement of the la\v 
applicable to his case. His requested Instructions 19 and 
21, are sub stan ti{llly covered in several instructions actual-
ly given to the jury, since all go directly to the question 
of his intent See Instructions Nos. 9, 11t 12 and 16. 
The court did not commit error here and no harm of 
any kind 'vas done to Garcia~ 
POINT VII 
THE TRIAL COURrr DID NOT ERR I~ RE-
FUSI)J"G 1~0 GIVE APPELL1\NT'S REQt~ES1.ED 
INSTRlJCTIO~ l\0. 20. 
The legal substance of appellanCs requested Instruc-
tion l\To. 20 (App. llrieft pg~ 38) is fully ~et forth in the 
court" s Instruction :\J o. 7. The last paragraph thereof states 
as follows: 
~'To \varrant you in convicting the defendant, 
the evidence must~ to your minds, exclude every 
rea so na bl e hypothesis other than that of the guilt. 
of the defendant. That is to say, if after an entire 
consideration and comparison of all the testimony 
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in the case, you can reasonably explain the facts 
given in evidence on any reasonable ground other 
than the guilt of the defendant, you should acquit 
him.t~ (R. 103) 
This is not an abstract instruction. It applies ex-
actly to the facts at hand~ Stated in his own way, appel~ 
lan tt s requested instruction limits the jury to a 
consideration of just tV\~o hypotheses-one~ standing guard 
for sodomy, and two, having the intent to commit the 
crime of murder. 
The instruction given, however, does not so l.i.mit the 
jury. In fact~ if the jury believes any other reasonable hy-
pothesis than that urged by the state, the defendant cannot 
be convicted. Thus~ Instruction No~ 7 gives even greater 
leeway to acquit than does the proposed instruction. 
It is possible the judge could have used more exact 
language even though the instruction cannot really be 
called abstract. Nevertheless, there is no question that by 
it, the jury was given to know its responsibility. 
This was a clear-cut case and the court, even if it 
detects error, should follow the reasoning of Justice Wolfe 
in his dissent in State v. Thompson;! 110 U~ 113_, 170 P.2d 
153: 
~'* * $ A slight fault in a close case may be prejudi-
cial whilst in a case where the evidence is such 
that it \vould be most unlikely that the jury could 
ha,.=-e been misled by error~ it would not be 
prejudicial.j~ 
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POINT VIII 
THE TRIAL COURT DID .NOT ERR IN 
FAILING TO CO~-IPEL THE PROSbCL'TIOl\T TO 
FURNISH TAPE RECORDIKGS AND COPIES 
OF ST A TE:rviE~TS 1viADE BY WITNESSES AND 
DEFENDANT~ 
It is a discretionary matter with the trial judge n.s to 
how far a defendant should be allo\ved to go in the exam-
ination of notes, statements and recordings made prior to 
trial by the prosecution. 
l\ defendantts request :must be based on an appreciable 
showing \vhy such statements and recordings should be 
produced~ That was not done. vVhether or not accused has 
made a showing sufficient to entitle him to have the docu~ 
ments produced L'3 a matter which rests in the discretion 
of the trial courtr 23 C~J.S. 855~ pg. 58. 
Here~ the court, for reasons satisfactory to it~ did not 
see fit to order the prosecution to give certain wire record-
ings to defendant However~ they were available for inspec-
tion by the defense andt in fact, 1Nere heard by counsel for 
defendantj even though the recordings were not used in 
evidence. Copies of written statements were also provided 
for defendanf~ counsel; so, appellant~s motion is without 
merit 
Certain statements were used to impeach Garcia and 
he was asked whether or not he had made the statements. 
In many cases, he answered in the affirmative. If appel-
lant had told the truth all the 'vay through from the be-
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ginning of the investigation to the end of the trial, his 
testimony would have been consistent at all times, and 
possession of the statements would not have been of any 
assistance to him~ 
The judge did not err in limiting the scope of the 
production Gf documents in this matter. If, in fact, there 
was error, it was not prejudicial in light of all the evidence 
in the trial. 
POINT IX 
THE TRIAl-~ COURrr DID )JOT ERR IN RE-
FCSll\G TO GRANT A 1\E\V TRIAL. 
Appellant claims a ne'\v trial should have been ordered 
for reasons set forth in his motion~ But, in his argument 
he discusses but three of the seven grounds. Inasmuch as 
the others appear to be without foundation, respondent 
will deal only with those argued~ 
The first ground is that the trial \\-~as had in the ab-
sence of the defendant. The second ground is that the jury 
received evidence out of court. Both of these points were 
fully argued in respondenfs Point I of this brief and any 
repetition here would be an imposition upon the court's 
time. 
A ppeJlant alleges as his third ground that a new trial 
should be granted because of the separation of jurors for 
the purpose of going to restrooms. There is no allegation 
or ev ide nee -..,v hatsoever that the jurors talked with any-
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body except each other at that time and the fact that the 
elevator would not accommodate a dozen jurors and a 
bailiff without creating a dangerous hazard made it imper-
ative that if they were to avail themselves of this means 
of transportation, and the desired relief, they 1vould have 
to divide into two sections. 
It 'vas held in State v. Jarrett~ 112 U. 335~ 187 P42d 547 j 
that an interpretation preventing jurors from separation 
for purposes of necessity 1..vou ld be an unreasonable con-
struction of the statute. The court said: 
'' • * * r'rhe right of a defendant to ha \:"e a jury se-
cluded from outside influences \V hile de Iibera tin g 
should be jealously guardedr However~ this right 
must not be founded on an unreasonable and an 
un,varranted construction of a statute. The statute 
must be: construed in regard to the correlative 
righ t:3 of the defendant and the jurors.'~ 
POINT X 
THE TRIAL COUnT DID :\rOT EllR 11\ DE-
)J\Tll\G APPELLA:J1''S ?dOTIOK TO STRIKE 
TESTIJ\10NY SIIO"\\riNG A CONSPIRi~ .. C\~ TO 
CO:f\-'T~·fTT MURDER. 
An actual conspiracy to commit murder 'vas entered 
into by all the participants in the killing, including Garcia. 
The jury was convinced that Garcia kne\v in advance 
about the murder and that this knowledge derived from a 
conversation at which both he and Rivenburgh were pres-
ent~ along with others~ before the killing. 
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"\ 
That thls is so~ is shown in the statements of 
Garcia himself taken during an investigation at the State 
Prisonj which statements were read into the record by Lt. 
Robinson and Sgt. Haueter under examination by Mr. 
Banks~ See discussion under respondent~s Point I. 
Thus, an actual conspiracy was made out by the evi-
dence and the judge did not err in refusing to strike evi-
dence as to it. 
POINT XI 
THE TRIAL COURT DID )JOT ERR I)J SUB-
MITTING THE CASE TO THE Jl:R"'Y~ ON FIRST 
DEGREE MURDER AFTER CONSIDER1\ TION 
OF APPELLANT 1S MENTAL CONDITION. 
Appellant urges that the jur:y could not rightly find 
beyond reasonable doubt that he was capable of premedi-
tation and deliberation. He deems this true because of 
statements made by hls psychlatrist, Dr. Nelson. 
The state, however~ placed two psychiatrists on the 
stand (T~ 651), both of whom testified that Garcia knew 
the consequences of hls actst that he knew they were 
wrong according to la-\v and morals~ and that he could 
control his impulses; and one of whom gave an opinion on 
the matter of premeditation and deliberation contrary to 
that of appellant's 'Witness. 
The princip I es set forth at Point I I~ supra~ d eating 
with reasonable hypothesis} etc.,. apply here just as in the 
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determination of the other facts of the case, and that argu-
ment is adopted here .. 
Again it is the sole and exclusive province of the jury 
to determine the facts even where evidence is in absolute 
conflict, and this is so even as to the question of sanity L 
State Vr Green, supra+ 
The mere existence of conflict in testimony, and even 
the alleged closer contact of one doctor than the other 
with the defendant does not in any way foreclose the 
court from submitting the question to the jury-. Any doubt 
as to the ability of appellant to premeditate and deliberate 
"\vas a matter for determination by the jury and not by the 
judge. The court~ therefore~ committed no error. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant was given a proper trial by an experien-ced 
and capable trial judge before a fair and impartial ju1y. 
The trial was conducted without prejudicial erTor+ Appel-
lant's appeal is groundless and his conviction should be 
affirmed~ 
May 11~ 1960 
Respectfully submitted, 
'VALTER L. BUDGE 
Attorney General 
VERNON B. R0~1l'\EY 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Re ~-pondent 
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